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Antitakeover Provisions and CEO Monetary Benefits:  
Revisiting the E-Index 
Abstract: 
  
We analyze and group antitakeover provisions as they relate to CEO’s monetary benefits. We 
specifically focus on the determinants of the six E-index provisions that were proposed by 
Bebchuk et Al. (2009) to conversely affect firm value. The six provisions are split into two 
indices: those that provide managers with a monetary benefit if a takeover was successful (MB 
provisions) and those that do not (TP provisions). Results indicate that CEOs with a role duality 
use their power to influence the adoption of MB provisions and resist the adoption of TP 
provisions. Moreover, in the presence of CEO duality, the relationship between MB provisions 
and firm value worsens. On the other hand, the relationship between TP provisions and firm 
value is unaffected by the presence of CEO duality. This suggests that CEOs having a role duality 
do not feel the need to work in the shareholders’ best interest when entrenched with MB 
provisions. Our findings suggest that studying all the provisions of the E-index as a whole can be 
misleading in some cases. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance; antitakeover provisions; CEO duality; managerial 
entrenchment 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The market for corporate control is one of the main mechanisms used to discipline 
incompetent managers (Dalton et al., 2007). Empirical evidence suggests that antitakeover 
provisions entrench managers in their positions at the company (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011; Sundaramurthy, 1998). By adopting antitakeover 
provisions, managers try to insulate themselves from a takeover threat even if their firm is 
under-performing (Bebchuk et al., 2009). However, other researchers argue that takeover 
defenses are beneficial to shareholders because they result in a higher bid premium 
(Comment and Schwert, 1995; Harris, 1990; Stein, 1988). 
One limitation in previous studies addressing the determinants of takeover defenses is the 
focus on a single or limited number of provisions (Cochran et al., 1985; Heron and Lie, 2005; 
Mallette and Fowler, 1992). However, due to the nature of takeover defenses, some 
provisions can act as substitutes and failing to control for the presence of other provisions 
might provide inaccurate results. Therefore, our paper investigates the determinants of six 
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provisions that form the entrenchment index (E-Index) presented by Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
These six E-Index provisions have been found to have a significantly negative effect on firm 
performance. Studying the determinants of these provisions provides a better insight on the 
motives behind adopting takeover defenses. We look at different CEO, governance, and firm 
characteristics to observe the variables that inflate (or deflate) managerial entrenchment. 
Moreover, this paper provides a new way to group and study antitakeover provisions. In 
addition to making a takeover process harder, some provisions provide managers with 
monetary benefits if a takeover successfully takes place1 while others do not2. Agency theory 
suggests that managers could pursue opportunities that would provide them with financial 
outcome regardless of its effect on shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Therefore, managerial preferences could differ between one provision and another based on 
the monetary benefit associated with it. Accordingly, study groups antitakeover provisions 
into two groups based on the monetary benefits acquired by a manager if a takeover is 
successful.  
As a result, we study the determinants of the E-index as well as the determinants of the 
individual provisions from the two categories of takeover defenses. We focus on the 
relationship between CEO duality and each of the two categories of provisions to check if 
powerful CEOs act in an opportunistic way to influence the adoption of the provisions that 
provide them with personal benefits. Our Empirical evidence provides surprising results 
regarding the determinants of the E-Index. Contrary to agency theory and the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis suggestions, independent directors seem to favor the adoption of the 
                                                          
1 We are going to refer to these provisions as MB (Monetary Benefit) provisions. MB provisions include: 
Golden parachutes, Poison Pills and Staggered Boards. More discussion on the grouping process is provided in 
the methodology section. 
2 These provisions will be called TP (Takeover Protection) provisions and they include: Supermajority 
Requirement to Approve a Merger, Limitations on Bylaw Amendments and Limitations on Charter 
Amendments 
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E-index provisions while CEOs acting as chairmen of the board are against the adoption of 
such provisions. Upon splitting the provisions into the two indices, the results become more 
consistent with the agency theory. We observe that CEOs acting as chairmen of the board 
support the adoption of MB provisions and oppose the adoption of TP provisions. Further 
tests also show a trade-off between the adoption of the two categories of provisions. This 
explains the CEO’s behavior of opposing TP provisions in order to adopt MB provisions that 
provide them with personal benefits. 
In addition, we show that, in the presence of CEO duality, the relationship between MB 
provisions and firm value worsens significantly. On the other hand, the relationship between 
TP provisions and firm value is unaffected by the presence of CEO duality. This indicates 
that CEOs acting as chairmen of the board feel demotivated in the presence of MB 
provisions, which leads to a further deterioration in firm value. Other findings show that 
independent directors generally oppose the adoption of MB provisions and favor the adoption 
of TP provisions. 
Finally, we conclude that the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance 
depends on the levels of governance and shareholder rights3. In companies with high (low) 
levels of governance and shareholder rights, CEO duality has a positive (negative) effect on 
firm performance. Thus, we provide partial support for the agency and stakeholder theories 
and conclude that one theory on its own cannot explain the complex aspects of corporate 
governance. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest that there are four paradigms used in social science 
studies that help in classifying and understanding sociological theories. This paper employs a 
positivist functionalist viewpoint to address the research questions. In other words, we 
                                                          
3 Gompers et al. (2003) suggest that adopting a high (low) amount of antitakeover provisions is associated with 
poor (strong) levels of governance and shareholder rights  
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assume that people act in a rational way and that organizational behavior can be better 
understood through empirical hypothesis testing. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section two surveys the literature and 
develops the hypothesis of this paper. Section three discusses the data used in this study. 
Section four provides descriptive statistics and empirical testing of our hypothesis. Section 
five concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Literature Review 
Researchers argue that there are two opposing arguments explaining the adoption of 
antitakeover provisions (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983). The managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis suggests that managers are willing to adopt takeover defenses to decrease the 
probability of a takeover, even if it is not in the shareholders’ best interest. Dah (2016) finds 
that managers, during recessionary periods, are more entrenched and engage in higher levels 
of empire building than during normal periods. This aggravates agency problems between 
managers and shareholders leading to a worsened performance by firms who are already 
suffering from the economic situation. Humphery-Jenner and Powell (2011) provide evidence 
that takeovers in Australia (a country with no antitakeover provisions) are value enhancing 
while the ones in the US market (a country where antitakeover provisions are common) are 
made for empire building. The authors believe that this is consistent with the entrenchment 
hypothesis since managers can engage in bad acquisitions safely because of the protection 
they have from the market for corporate control. Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013) add that 
entrenched managers engage freely in empire building activities due to the high cost of 
removing them from their positions.  
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The second argument supports the shareholder interest hypothesis for adopting 
antitakeover provisions (Becker-Blease, 2011). Stein (1988) believes that the presence of 
antitakeover provisions increases a manager’s bargaining power leading to a higher bid 
premium. In addition, the presence of antitakeover provisions promotes a feeling of safety for 
managers to engage in long-term investments without having to worry about a possible 
takeover in the near future  
Previous studies show that golden parachutes are inversely related to firm size (Cochran 
et al., 1985; Comment and Schwert, 1995; Wade et al., 1990) and to previous financial 
performance (Cochran et al., 1985; Heron and Lie, 2005). Managers of large firms will feel 
secure due to the high cost and complexity of taking over a large firm and, therefore, do not 
need antitakeover provisions for extra protection (Jensen, 1988). Moreover, firms tend to 
adopt antitakeover provisions in response to poor performance by a company’s stock in the 
previous year, an event that would increase the possibility of a takeover (Heron and Lie, 
2005). Harris (1990) believes that golden parachutes can help in solving agency problem 
between managers and shareholders. Managers are usually unwilling to have a takeover 
threat because most takeovers result in a change of management and the manager will 
ultimately lose his job. However, by providing managers with a large payment (a golden 
parachute), they will have less reason to try and block a takeover and might even be 
motivated to try and reach a successful deal. 
Concerning other provisions, researchers find that managerial ownership is inversely 
related to the implementation of poison pills (Davis, 1991; Heron and Lie, 2005; Mallette and 
Fowler, 1992). Mallette and Fowler (1992) believe that as managerial ownership increases, 
managers are more likely to act in the shareholders’ best interest and therefore will not adopt 
antitakeover provisions. Boyle et al. (1998) presents results consistent with the entrenchment 
hypothesis. The author’s findings show that managers entrench themselves by either having 
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high ownership in the corporation or by adopting antitakeover provisions. In addition, 
Mallette and Fowler (1992) find that CEO duality increases the likelihood of adopting a 
poison pill. This is consistent with the agency theory where a CEO uses the role duality for 
personal benefits to entrench himself in the company.  
2.2 Grouping process and hypotheses development 
Dependent Variable: Entrenchment 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) construct the E-index using six of the 24 provisions that form 
the G-index4 . These E-index provisions were found to be the driving factor behind the 
reduction in firm performance. The E-index is a scale variable where the presence of each 
provisions adds a point to the E-index. Thus, a value of zero indicates a low entrenchment 
level and the absence of all antitakeover provisions, while a value of six indicates a high level 
of entrenchment and the presence of all six provisions. Since the IRRC does not put out data 
on antitakeover provisions every year, we follow previous literature and use a filling method 
to fill in the missing data (Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003). We assume that, for a 
missing year, the antitakeover provisions present at a certain company are the same as the 
ones reported in the previous year. Other filling methods do not significantly affect our 
results. 
As mentioned previously, the E-Index will be split into two categories of provisions 
based on the monetary outcome provided to a manager. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Gompers et al. (2003) construct the G-Index by grouping 24 antitakeover provisions into one index. However, 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) provide evidence that only 6 of these 24 provisions have a significant effect on firm 
performance 
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The Grouping Process 
Sokolyk (2011) argues that different antitakeover provisions have different effects on 
the firm adopting them. Building up on this argument, we hypothesize that managers and 
independent directors have different preferences for different antitakeover provisions. 
Antitakeover provisions could serve as a one-line defense or as a two-line defense for 
managers. The first line of defense, which is common among all antitakeover provisions, is 
that these provisions do make a takeover process harder. The second line of defense, which is 
only applicable to certain provisions, is that even if a takeover successfully takes place, a 
manager would receive a monetary compensation. The provisions of the E-Index are split into 
two categories based on the monetary benefits acquired by a manager after a successful 
takeover takes place. The two categories of provisions are as follows: 
Monetary Benefit provisions  
MB provisions are the provisions that are expected to provide, or help in providing, a 
manager with a two-line defense facing a takeover threat. One of the assumptions of agency 
theory is that the interests of managers and shareholders could diverge due to the self-
interested human behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, managers may prefer some 
provisions over others based on the monetary outcome provided to the manager. In other 
words, we expect managers to prefer having two lines of defense against takeover rather than 
the non-monetary compensating one line defense.  
The provisions included in this monetary benefit index are: Poison pills, golden 
parachutes and staggered boards. Poison pills and golden parachutes are included because 
they directly provide managers with monetary benefits when a takeover takes place. On the 
other hand, staggered boards are included because the presence of a staggered board is crucial 
for a poison pill to be effective (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005). Although staggered boards do 
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not provide a direct monetary benefit to managers, they help in providing the monetary 
benefit from poison pills and, therefore, are included in the MB provision. 
Takeover Protection Provisions 
TP provisions are the remaining provisions of the E-Index which only provide the 
first line of defense for managers. These provisions simply make a takeover process harder 
without providing any benefit for a manager in case a takeover takes place. The provisions 
included in this category are: Supermajority requirement to approve a merger, limits to bylaw 
amendments and limits to charter amendments. 
CEO Duality and the Adoption of Antitakeover Provisions 
Researchers claim that one of the main reasons behind recent scandals and 
governance problems is the presence of CEO duality which leads to a weak governance 
structure (Jackling and Johl, 2009). According to agency theory, single leadership (one 
person serving as both CEO and COB) would give too much power to one individual, 
allowing him to dominate the board of directors and their decisions (Boyd, 1994; Dayton, 
1984). Therefore, a dual leadership structure (two different persons serving as CEO and 
COB) is recommended to increase board independence and enhance the alignment of interest 
between managers and stockholders (Coles et al., 2001).  
When we split the E-Index into MB and TP provisions, we expect a significant 
difference in the relationship between these categories and CEO duality. Powerful CEOs act 
in an opportunistic way to increase their wealth (Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2012). Core et 
al. (1999) find that CEOs acting as chairmen of the board abuse the power given to them by 
seeking to maximize their own personal wealth. Building up on these arguments, CEOs are 
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expected to influence the adoption of MB provisions, which provide them with a financial 
benefit in the case of a takeover. 
Hypothesis 1-a: There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and the adoption of MB 
provisions. 
CEOs already have structural power due to their position in their firm, which could 
also be enhanced if they serve as chairmen of the board (Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2012). 
However, the monitoring of independent directors attempts to control the power given to a 
CEO (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Brickley et al., 1994; Combs et al., 2007). This creates a fair 
balance of power at some firms and, therefore, we expect that a CEO could only influence the 
adoption of a limited amount of takeover provisions. In addition, researchers suggest that 
antitakeover provisions have a negative effect on firm performance (Bebchuk et al., 2009; 
Gompers et al., 2003). Knowing so, it is expected that firms will not adopt a large number of 
provisions since each adoption will negatively affect firm value. As a result, we investigate if 
an opportunistic CEO opposes the adoption of TP provisions in order to have a higher 
probability of adopting MB provisions.  
Hypothesis 1-b: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and the adoption of TP 
provisions. 
Board Independence and the Adoption of Antitakeover Provisions 
A company’s board of directors is considered one of the main instruments used in 
corporate governance to monitor managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and, therefore, align the 
interests of managers and shareholders (Kang et al., 2007). From an agency theory 
perspective, Dalton et al. (2007) claim that this alignment of interest is better achieved by 
increasing the percentage of independent directors serving on the board. Increasing the 
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percentage of independent directors has been linked with an increase in firm value (Setia-
Atmaja, 2009), higher CEO turnover when a firm is underperforming (Weisbach, 1988), 
higher degree of transparency (Chiang and He, 2010) and a better capital structure (Alves et 
al. 2015) 
According to agency theory, independent directors try to repel a manager’s attempt to 
adopt antitakeover provisions (Singh and Harianto, 1989). Therefore, we expect independent 
directors to oppose the adoption of MB provisions which are favorable to managers and 
provide a more entrenching effect to managers. 
Hypothesis 2-a: There is a negative relationship between the percentage of independent 
directors and the adoption of MB provisions. 
Since antitakeover provisions provide the management team with a higher bargaining 
power (Comment and Schwert, 1995; Heron and Lie, 2005), independent directors might 
support the adoption of a few antitakeover provisions. We hypothesize that independent 
directors favor the adoption of TP provisions rather than MB provisions because they provide 
managers with a lesser entrenching effect. 
Hypothesis 2-b: Independent directors prefer the adoption of TP provisions rather than the 
adoption of MB provisions. 
Research Philosophy 
The objective of this section is to highlight the use of the research methodology and 
explain its limitations. Ontological and epistemological layers are used to relate the 
research’s basic assumption to the methodological techniques used. Ontology refers to the 
way we understand reality while epistemology resembles a theory of knowledge (Lagoarde-
Segot, 2016b). Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest that there are two different ontological 
 11 
 
positions: objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism acknowledges that a firm is an entity 
that has an objective reality. In contrast, subjectivism claims the absence of an objective 
reality and that the social phenomena are in a continuous revision state (Ardalan, 2017). 
Similarly, researchers suggest that there are two epistemological positions that resemble this 
theory of knowledge: the interpretivist and the positivist. The goal of positivism is to gather 
data and use existing theories to create hypothesis that can be empirically tested and present 
generalizable policies (Lagoarda-Segot, 2016a). On the other hand, Saunders et al., (2003) 
suggests that generalization is not of significant importance in interpretivist epistemology. 
Interpretivists aim to understand the world from their subjects’ point of view by entering their 
world and taking a sympathetic stand with them.  
Given the nature of this research, and consistent with modern finance literature, this study 
adopts an objective positivist approach based on hypothetic-deductive reasoning. While this 
study attempts to study the determinants of different antitakeover provisions and come up 
with policy suggestions, more work needs to be done that embraces ethical concerns and their 
reflections on the society’s well-being. Lagoarde-Segot (2016a) suggests that inferring 
policies by empirically observing facts while giving less attention to deeper levels (real and 
actual) can provide incomplete results. Therefore, this paper is considered a step in the 
process of analyzing takeover defenses and their effect on firm performance. 
3. Dataset and model variables 
3.1 Data 
The firms included in this research are mainly from the S&P Composite 1500 index. This 
index is merges three major indices into one; S&P small-cap 600, S&P mid-cap 400 and S&P 
500. Thus, the S&P 1500 covers a wide variety of US companies, consisting of around 90% 
of the total market capitalization in the United States. In addition to covering a wide portion 
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of the US market, the dataset ranges from 1992 till 2015, allowing this research to reach more 
reliable conclusions. The early 1990s witnessed a huge increase in the adoption of 
antitakeover provisions. Therefore, this time period is important to study the rise of 
antitakeover provisions from the early 1990s up to the recent years. 
3.2 Data Source 
The data is collected from the CompuStat, ExecuComp and the RiskMetrics governance 
databases. CompuStat provides information on firms’ financials (such as capital expenditure, 
spending on research and development, etc…). Information about the CEO compensation and 
titles is presented by the ExecuComp database. Finally, information on governance variables 
such as managerial entrenchment, board size, percentage of independent directors etc… is 
acquired from the RiskMetrics database. 
3.3 Control Variables 
Consistent with the literature, this research also controls for several firm characteristics that 
could influence the adoption of antitakeover provisions. Specifically, our study controls for 
firm size, leverage and previous firm performance (Cochran et al., 1985; Heron and Lie, 
2005; Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Wade et al., 1990). A large firm size acts as a takeover 
deterrent due to the complexity and high cost of such firms (Cyert et al., 2002). Similarly, 
highly levered firms are also expensive to acquire.  Therefore, these firms have less need to 
adopt antitakeover provisions than small firms and/or low levered firms. Moreover, firms 
with weak previous performance become underpriced in the market. Under-priced firms are 
lucrative investment opportunities for acquirers and, thus, tend to adopt more takeover 
defenses than fairly priced firms. 
 13 
 
This study also controls for CEO ownership since a high managerial ownership level 
is perceived as a substitute for antitakeover provisions (Singh and Harianto, 1989). In 
addition, we control for R&D expenditure as a proxy for long-term investments since 
managers might adopt antitakeover provisions to engage in long-term investments freely 
(Becker-Blease, 2011; Stein, 1988). Finally, our study controls for board size since smaller 
boards inspire a better governance structure (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001; Yermack, 1996) 
Research Model: 
Entrenchment = Board Composition + CEO Duality + Board Size + CEO Ownership 
Previous Performance + Control Variables (Firm Size, Leverage, Long-term Investments). 
ATPi,t=0 + 1*Dualityi,t + 2*Indepi,t + 3*BoardSizei,t + 4*Ownershipi,t + 5*ROAi,t-1 + 
4*FirmSizei,t+ 4*Leveragei,t + 4*R&Di,t + j + i,t 
Where the subscripts i, t, and j refer to firm, year, and industry respectively. represents a set 
of industry dummies. ATP refers to the antitakeover provision under study. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Stand. 
Dev. 
Number of 
obs. 
E-Index 2.47 1.360 24,178 
Golden Parachute .657 .475 24,178 
Poison Pill .436 .496 24,178 
Staggered Board .561 .496 24,178 
Supermajority Req. .313 .464 24,178 
Bylaw Amendment .339 .474 24,178 
Charter Amendment .254 .435 24,178 
% Independent Directors 61.284 27.281 23,620 
CEO Duality .349 .477 35,161 
CEO Ownership 4.121 7.83 33,634 
Lag ROA .123 .227 28,907 
Board Size 8.520 3.779 23,620 
Firm Size 7.506 1.791 34,784 
Leverage .192 .190 34,783 
R&D Expenditure .029 .118 34,922 
Table 1 presents a descriptive statistic for the variables used in this study. Continuous variables have been 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to account for outliers. 
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables to be used in this paper. It can be 
seen that, on average, companies have around 2 or 3 of the antitakeover provisions 
comprising the E-index (2.47). Among the six antitakeover provisions, the golden parachute 
provision has the highest level of adoption in this sample (65.7%) while the limitation on 
charter amendment provision has the lowest level of adoption (25.3%). 
To test for multicollinearity, we run spearman’s rank correlation (table 2) and find that 
the correlation coefficient of all variables is below 0.5. Gujarati (2003) states that for a 
multicollinearity problem to exist between two variables, the correlation coefficient should be 
greater than or equal to 0.8. We also calculate VIF for our variables and the results show that 
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the VIF of all variables was below 2.5, confirming that no multicollinearity problems are 
expected between the variables (Gujarati, 2003). Finally, a Hausman test is implemented to 
check whether a fixed effect model or a random effect model should be used. Results support 
using a fixed effect model for our regression analysis. 
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Table 2: Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
 
E-Index 
CEO 
Duality % Indep CEO Own 
Board 
Size Firm Size Leverage Liquidity ROA R&D  Adv.  
Capital 
Exp 
E-Index 1 
           CEO Duality -0.1252 1 
          % Indep 0.2171 -0.0782 1 
         CEO Own -0.0552 0.0338 -0.1569 1 
        Board Size 0.1112 -0.0008 0.3955 -0.2017 1 
       Firm Size 0.0573 0.0549 0.1982 -0.3471 0.4792 1 
      Leverage 0.0752 0.102 0.0286 -0.0921 0.1642 0.2949 1 
     Liquidity -0.0437 -0.1225 0.053 0.0471 -0.1875 -0.2842 -0.4446 1 
    ROA -0.0581 0.038 -0.0584 0.0167 -0.0489 -0.1259 -0.1153 0.1037 1 
   R&D Exp -0.018 0.0138 0.057 -0.0918 -0.1626 -0.2131 -0.2397 0.4044 0.052 1 
  Adv. Exp -0.043 -0.0428 0.0044 0.0222 0.0171 -0.013 -0.1074 0.1616 0.1205 0.0311 1 
 Capital Exp -0.0578 0.0868 -0.1154 -0.018 -0.0688 -0.1117 0.1026 -0.1128 0.4391 -0.0428 -0.0036 1 
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Figure 1: Percentage of MB provisions by CEO Duality 
  
Figure 1 displays the level of adoption of the monetary benefit (MB) provisions for firms with/without CEO 
duality. 
Figure 2: Percentage of TP provisions by CEO Duality 
 
Figure 2 displays the level of adoption of the Takeover Protection (TP) provisions for firms with/without CEO 
duality. 
13.42%
31.62%
33.64%
21.33%
13.05%
20.21%
33.83%
32.9%
No CEO Duality CEO Duality
0 1 2 3
% of MB provisions by CEO duality
43.21%
30.37%
17.42%
8.997%
67.97%
24.49%
6.295%
1.241%
No CEO Duality CEO Duality
0 1 2 3
% of TP Provisions by CEO Duality
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Figures 1 and 2 show how the percentages of MB and TP provisions vary across firms 
in the presence or absence of CEO duality. Figure 1 shows that the probability of having all 3 
provisions from the monetary benefit index increases in the presence of CEO duality (32.9% 
in the presence of CEO Duality; 21.33% otherwise). On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that 
67.98% of the firms with CEO duality do not have any provision from the takeover protection 
index. In the absence of CEO duality, this percentage decreases to 43.21%. These preliminary 
findings tend to support our trade-off hypothesis between the two categories of provisions. 
Powerful CEOs seem to favor the adoption of MB provisions and oppose the adoption of TP 
provisions. The next section presents regression analysis to test the significance of the 
findings found in figures 1 and 2.  
4.2 Determinants of antitakeover provisions 
This section starts by studying the provisions of the E-Index. The E-index provisions are 
then split into two groups based on our grouping process (MB and TP provisions). We study 
the determinants of each provision from both indices separately to validate the rationality of 
our grouping process. In other words, if the determinants of the two groups of provisions 
provide divergent results, this would justify our grouping process and support our hypothesis 
for grouping the E-index provisions into two separate indices. 
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Table 3 Determinants of the E-Index 
  E-Index 
% Independent Directors 0.0088*** 
CEO Duality -0.213*** 
CEO Ownership -0.0301*** 
Board Size -0.0147*** 
Lag ROA -0.1969* 
Firm Size -0.0266*** 
Leverage 0.3279*** 
R&D Expenditure -1.8069 
Constant 2.1137*** 
Adjusted R2 0.1226 
N 22514 
Industry Dummies Yes 
Table 3 presents an industry fixed effect regression for the determinants of the E-index. The dependent variable 
is the E-index which is a categorical value ranging from 0 to 6 (with 0 indicating a firm with no takeover 
defenses while 6 designates a firm that adopted all 6 takeover defenses). Robust standard errors are computed 
following White (1980) to account for potential heteroskedasticity. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 
and 99 percentiles. The asterisks ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Table 3 investigates the determinants of antitakeover provisions. Contrary to agency 
theory suggestions, the percentage of independent directors is positively related to the 
adoption of antitakeover provisions. In addition, CEO duality has a negative relationship with 
the E-index. Although antitakeover provisions entrench managers in their position, the results 
show that independent directors favor the adoption of these entrenching provisions. On the 
other hand, powerful CEOs oppose the adoption of takeover defenses that would provide 
them with a protection from the market for corporate control. These striking results indicate 
that, contrary to agency theory, antitakeover provisions increase with board independence 
and decrease with CEO duality. However, as shown below, the division of the anti-takeover 
provisions into MB and TP provisions helps explain these surprising and unanticipated 
results.  
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Studying the determinants of individual provisions 
In this section, the provisions of the E-Index are split into the two aforementioned 
categories (MB and TP provisions). We run probit regressions for each provision to test if the 
individual provisions support our method of grouping the takeover defenses. In any given 
regression, we also control for the presence of the other five provisions. Two different indices 
are used when controlling for the remaining provisions. When studying the determinants of a 
provision from the monetary benefit category, an index of the other two MB provisions will 
be created as a control variable along with the index for TP provisions5. This grouping 
process is chosen since the provisions of each category could act as substitutes to one 
another. For example, the compensation obtained from having a poison pill may replace the 
need of having a golden parachute to obtain another kind of compensation. In the same sense, 
the takeover protection effect of one TP provision acts as a substitute for the takeover 
protection of another TP provision.   
Table 4 shows that the three MB provisions (poison pills, golden parachutes and 
classified boards) support hypothesis 1-a. Results indicate that there is a positive relationship 
between CEO duality and each of the three provisions. The presence of a CEO duality 
increases the likelihood of adopting takeover defenses that provide them with a two line 
defense against a takeover threat. We also demonstrate that as the percentage of independent 
directors increases, the probability of adopting a poison pill or a staggered board decreases 
(partial support for hypothesis 2-a). This confirms our previous assumption that a powerful 
CEO is more likely to favor the adoption of these provisions than independent directors. 
However, the relationship between independent directors and golden parachutes is 
significantly positive. We will address this result later on in the paper. 
                                                          
5 Probit regressions are also run where we control for each provision separately. The results are qualitatively 
similar. 
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Table 4: Board Compositions and the Adoption of MB Provisions 
 
Golden Parachute Poison Pills Staggered Board 
CEO Duality 0.0809** 0.5186*** 0.0683** 
% Independent Directors 0.0124*** -0.0008* -0.0037*** 
CEO Ownership -0.0416*** -0.0315*** 0.0046** 
Board Size -0.0207*** -0.0030 0.0364*** 
Lag ROA -0.6953*** 0.0974 -0.2338** 
Firm Size 0.0340*** -0.1238*** -0.1110*** 
Leverage 0.1991*** 0.5369*** -0.0022 
R&D Expenditure -1.8390*** 1.0299*** -2.4940*** 
TP Provisions -0.0779*** -0.0397*** 0.2187*** 
Remaining MB provisions 0.2445*** 
  Remaining MB provisions 
 
0.4006*** 
 Remaining MB provisions 
  
0.3701*** 
Constant -0.3951*** 0.2261*** 0.4041*** 
Adjusted R2              0.1101              0.1051             0.0583 
N 22639 22639 22639 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Table 4 presents a probit regression for the determinants of adopting MB provisions. The dependent variables 
(golden parachute, poison pill and staggered board) are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if the firm has 
adopted the provision and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are computed following White (1980) to account 
for potential heteroskedasticity. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. The asterisks 
***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Moving on to the next set of provisions, Table 5 shows the determinants of the 
individual TP provisions. Consistent with hypothesis 1-b, results suggest a negative 
relationship between CEO duality and the adoption of TP provisions. Moreover, there is a 
positive relationship between the percentage of independent directors and two of the TP 
takeover defenses (Supermajority Requirements and Limits on Charter Amendments). This is 
in compliance with our findings regarding the determinants of the E-index in table 5 and 
seems to be the driving factor behind it.  
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Independent directors seem to favor the adoption of these provisions while a CEO 
who is also the chairman of the board does not support their adoption. Although these three 
provisions do make a takeover process harder for a bidder firm, the negative sign of the CEO 
duality coefficient could indicate that CEOs do not have the power to influence the adoption 
of numerous takeover defenses. As a result, CEOs oppose the adoption of TP defenses in 
order to have a higher probability or more power in influencing the adoption of MB defenses. 
Table 5: Board Composition and the Adoption of TP Provisions 
Table 5 presents a probit regression for the determinants of adopting TP provisions. The dependent variables 
(Supermajority requirement to approve a merger, limitation on bylaw amendments and limitation on charter 
amendments) are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if the firm has adopted the provision and 0 otherwise. 
Robust standard errors are computed following White (1980) to account for potential heteroskedasticity. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. The asterisks ***, **, * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
  Supermajority Req. Bylaw Amendments 
Charter 
Amendments 
CEO Duality -0.5369*** -0.0932*** -0.8362*** 
% Independent Directors 0.0052*** 0.0074*** 0.0090*** 
CEO Ownership -0.0034 -0.0004 -0.0020 
Board Size 0.0074 -0.0091 -0.0509*** 
Lag ROA -0.0848 -0.0410 0.1253 
Firm Size 0.1197*** -0.0146 -0.0010 
Leverage -0.2725*** 0.2475*** 0.1153 
R&D Expenditure -2.9531*** 0.6992*** 0.1946 
MB Provisoins 0.1134*** 0.1026*** -0.1680*** 
Remaining TP provisions 0.0182 
  Remaining TP provisions 
 
0.8741*** 
 Remaining TP provisions 
  
1.2393*** 
Constant -1.6256*** -1.0992*** -1.6660*** 
Adjusted R2                                                    0.2257                              0.3208                             0.3092 
N                                                                       22639                               22639                              22639 
Industry Dummies                                         Yes                                     Yes                                   Yes 
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To confirm the validity of this assumption, we observe the coefficient estimates of the 
TP Index in table 5. Specifically, we check if there is a trade-off between the provisions that 
yield a monetary benefit to a CEO in case of a takeover and those that do not. As expected, 
table 5 highlights a negative relationship between poison pills and golden parachutes on the 
one hand and TP provisions on the other. That is, the adoption of TP provisions reduces the 
likelihood of adopting a poison pill or a golden parachute. This explains the negative 
relationship between CEO duality and TP provisions. Although TP provisions do help in 
entrenching a CEO in his company by making a takeover process harder, a CEO would be 
better off by adopting an entrenching provision that would also provide him with a monetary 
compensation in case a takeover attempt is successful. Therefore, a CEO opposes the 
adoption of TP provisions in order to have a higher probability of adopting a poison pill or a 
golden parachute. These results confirm the validity of grouping takeover defenses based on 
the monetary outcome provided to managers in case a takeover takes place.  
The Case of Golden Parachutes 
Most of the results presented in tables 4 and 5 support our aforementioned 
hypotheses. However, the only provision that was supported by both CEOs with a role duality 
and independent directors is the golden parachute. A study by Evans and Hefner (2009) helps 
explain the unanimous support for golden parachutes. They state that a golden parachute “is a 
recruitment tool that attracts a new management team that can return a financially risky firm 
to a satisfactory level of profitability” (Evans and Hefner, 2009; p.p. 66). Their results show 
that firms hiring new CEOs have a higher probability of adopting a golden parachute than 
firms that do not, thus confirming the argument that golden parachutes are given to attract 
new managers. The authors conclude by arguing that the presence of a golden parachute is an 
ethical process that should be supported by directors as well as managers. Zhao (2013) also 
suggests that the presence of severance packages in a manager’s contract, such as golden 
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parachutes, will enhance the manager’s engagement in investments with a positive but risky 
net present value. 
Another possible explanation for supporting golden parachutes can be observed by 
studying the compensation schemes of newly hired executives. Agrawal and Knoeber (1998) 
report that a golden parachute acts as a substitute for extra compensation for senior 
executives. Poorly performing firms cannot afford to pay excessive compensation packages 
to attract high quality managers in order to enhance the profitability of their firms. Therefore, 
by providing managers with a golden parachute, directors are transferring the liability of 
paying executive compensation from the shareholders to the bidding firm (by paying a higher 
premium) in case a takeover takes place (Choi, 2004). Studies show that there is a positive 
relationship between the size of a golden parachute and the premium paid to shareholders 
when a takeover takes place (Harris, 1990; Machlin et al., 1993). Harris (1990) also suggests 
that, in most cases, the additional premium paid to shareholders when a golden parachute is 
present exceeds the value of the parachute itself. Therefore, despite its entrenching effect for 
a firm’s manager, both managers and independent directors favor their adoption. Table 1 
provides support for this argument by showing that golden parachutes are the most common 
antitakeover provisions in our sample6. Accordingly, golden parachutes could be similar to 
other necessary costs incurred by firms7.  
Further Implications on Firm Value 
In a meta-analysis conducted to find the effect of CEO duality on firm performance, 
Rhoades et al. (2001) conclude that the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance depends on the focus of the study. Their findings provide partial support for 
                                                          
6 65.7% of the firms in our sample have golden parachutes 
 7 Such as compensation plans for managers, independent directors and auditors 
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both supporters and opponents of CEO duality. In the same sense, we expect to find different 
effects of CEO duality on firm value based on the levels of CEO entrenchment. 
According to agency theory, CEO duality further increases agency problems at companies 
as CEOs abuse the power given to them and look to extract private benefits (Dayton 1984). 
Therefore, when a CEO with a role duality adopts certain provisions for his own benefit (MB 
provisions), the impact on firm value might be even worse. In order to test the following 
assumption, two interaction variables will be introduced. Interaction variables between each 
of the two indices (MB and TP provisions) and CEO duality will be generated to test for the 
marginal impact of adopting these provisions in the presence of CEO duality.   
Table 6: Antitakeover Provisions and Firm Performance 
 
  Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
MB Provisions -0.0735*** -0.0418*** -0.0723*** 
 TP Provisions -0.1085*** -0.1071*** -0.1020*** 
 E INDEX 
   
-0.0747*** 
MB*duality 
 
-0.1134*** 
  TP*duality 
  
-0.0530 
 E*duality 
   
-0.0727*** 
CEO Duality 0.0285 0.2267*** 0.0523 0.2055*** 
% Independent Directors -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 
CEO Ownership 0.0080*** 0.0078*** 0.0080*** 0.0075*** 
Board Size -0.0021 -0.0027 -0.0021 -0.0020 
Firm Size -0.0051 -0.0040 -0.0053 -0.0081 
Leverage 0.0370 0.0361 0.0386 0.0453 
Liquidity 1.6969*** 1.6885*** 1.6960*** 1.6787*** 
ROA 5.4941*** 5.4956*** 5.4964*** 5.5032*** 
R&D Expenditure 6.6661*** 6.6698*** 6.6639*** 6.6661*** 
Advertising Expenditure 0.6638 0.6715 0.6510 0.6308 
Capital Expenditure 2.1426*** 2.1336*** 2.1322*** 2.1176*** 
Constant 0.1898 0.1399 0.1832 0.1957 
Adjusted R2 0.3615 0.3627 0.3616 0.3622 
N 22683 22683 22683 22683 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 6 presents a regression of firm performance on the adoption of antitakeover provisions and other firm and 
board characteristics. The dependent variable is firm performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. Interaction variables 
are introduced for the different antitakeover indices with CEO duality. Robust standard errors are computed 
following White (1980) to account for potential heteroskedasticity. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 
and 99 percentiles. The asterisks ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 6 shows the interaction between CEO Duality and different indices of antitakeover 
provisions8 . Following previous literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009) 
Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for firm value. Moreover, advertising and capital expenditures 
and liquidity are added to control for their effect on firm performance (Faleye, 2007; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; McConnel and Servaes, 1990).  
Table 6 indicates that, consistent with the previous literature, both MB and TP provisions 
have a negative effect on firm value (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007). However, the 
coefficient estimate of the interaction variable between MB provisions and CEO duality 
(model 2) is significantly negative. This implies that when a CEO acting as the chairman of 
the board adopts provisions from MB provisions, the effect on firm value is significantly 
worse than when a CEO with no role duality does so.  
Another important finding in table 6 is the coefficient of CEO duality in model 2 where 
we apply an interaction variable between MB provisions and CEO duality. The coefficient 
estimate of CEO duality in model 2 shows the impact of CEO duality on firm performance in 
the absence of all MB provisions. Unlike the propositions of agency theory, CEO duality 
increases firm value in this case9. The absence of all MB provisions could imply that this firm 
has a high level of shareholder rights and is enjoying a good governance level. In such firms, 
consistent with the stewardship theory, CEOs are motivated to achieve superior performance 
and act as stewards whose primary role is to maximize shareholder value (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). Introducing an interaction variable between the E-Index and CEO duality 
(model 4) yields similar results. The interaction coefficient between the E-Index and CEO 
duality negatively affects firm value. In addition, the absence of all the E-Index provisions 
                                                          
8 OLS regressions are run for the interactions between MB, TP, and the E-Index provisions on one hand and 
CEO duality on the other. 
9 The first column of table 6 shows that CEO duality has an insignificant effect on firm value when no 
interaction variable is introduced. 
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enhances the relationship between CEO duality and firm value. This is consistent with 
researchers who claim that a single theory (agency theory or stewardship theory) cannot fully 
explain the relationship between CEO duality and firm value on its own (Boyd, 1995; 
Brickley et al., 1997; Elsayed, 2007). Brickley (1997) concludes that both leadership 
structures have their advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, a single leadership structure 
could be beneficial to a firm while a dual leadership structure could be beneficial to another. 
On the other hand, model 3 of table 6 shows that there is no significant marginal impact of 
adopting provisions from the TP index on firm value in the presence of CEO duality. The 
coefficient of CEO duality on its own is also insignificant, indicating that the presence or 
absence of all TP provisions does not affect the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
value. This confirms our previous suggestions that CEOs with a role duality are affected by 
the presence/absence of MB provisions more than they are affected by the presence/absence 
of TP provisions. CEO duality can be beneficial for a firm with a high level of shareholder 
rights and a high level of governance (absence of MB provisions). 
Although both sets of provisions adversely affect firm value, the results above show 
that the presence of CEO duality leads to a further decrease in firm value in the presence of 
MB provisions. Providing a CEO with a role duality job, along with provisions that provide 
him with a monetary benefit in case the firm was taken over, gives a CEO too much power. 
This leads to the ultimate expropriation of shareholders’ rights, where a CEO can freely 
extract private benefits from a company. In such a case, a CEO does not fear the occurrence 
of a takeover, since the takeover will also provide the CEO with monetary benefits. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper provides a new idea of grouping and analyzing antitakeover provisions that is 
of particular importance when studying the relationship between governance variables and 
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takeover defenses. While the majority of recent literature settles that antitakeover provisions 
have a negative effect on firm performance, many studies fail to differentiate between 
different types of takeover defenses. Antitakeover provisions in this paper are grouped into 
two categories based on whether the provision under study provides, or helps in providing, a 
monetary outcome for a manager if a takeover is successful or not.  
This paper studies the determinants of the E-index as well as the determinants of its 
individual provisions. This is done to verify the rationality of the grouping process as our 
results suggest that there are significant differences in the determinants of individual 
provisions. Powerful CEOs and boards of directors have altered preferences for adopting 
takeover defenses. Upon studying the determinants of individual provisions, CEOs with a 
role duality favor (oppose) the adoption of all three MB (TP) provisions while independent 
directors are more likely to favor the adoption of TP provisions. CEOs having TP provisions 
still feel the need to continue working hard in order to protect their firm from a takeover and 
thus protect their position in their company. On the other hand, CEOs with MB provisions are 
highly entrenched in their company and have their position backed up with a monetary 
compensation if they were to be fired after a successful takeover. Further tests also show that 
the level of takeover defenses adopted by the company moderates the CEO duality-firm 
performance relationship. Specifically, CEO duality has a negative (positive) effect on firm 
performance in the presence (absence) of MB provisions. On the other hand, the presence of 
TP provisions does not have a significant impact on the relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance. This suggests that the combination of having CEO duality and 
adopting MB provisions leads to excessive CEO power which transforms into a worsened 
effect on firm performance. 
Our results suggest that studying the determinants of the E-index can be misleading since 
the results might be driven by only one or two of the six E-index provisions. Similarly, 
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studies addressing the effect of the E-index on other governance aspects might be misleading 
as well. Future researchers could highlight more on the differences between the two 
categories of provisions and their interaction with other governance mechanisms. As 
mentioned previously, this study only tests the empirical relationship for adopting 
antitakeover defenses without addressing deeper reality levels. This provides demi-
regularities that can offer clues for future researchers addressing the deeper reality levels of 
this study. Future studies also need to embraces ethical concerns and their reflections on the 
society’s well-being to touch on deeper levels (real and actual). 
The results of this paper are of particular importance to investors and practitioners. 
Although the literature demonstrates that the provisions of the E-index have a negative effect 
on firm performance, the motivation and the signals provided by adopting individual 
provisions might be different. Results show that the monetary benefit provisions are more 
entrenching and are adopted by opportunistic managers for private benefits. Previous studies 
show that investors are also interested and in the governance structure of the firm and are 
reluctant to invest in poorly governed firms (O’Connor, 2012). 
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 Variable Definition 
Advertising 
Expenditure 
The annual dollar amount spent by the company on advertising. 
Board Size The total number of directors serving on a company’s board 
Capital 
Expenditure 
 
The annual dollar amount spent by a company to acquire or upgrade its tangible assets 
MB provisions  Categorical variable ranging from 0 to 3. It includes the provisions that provide, or help in 
providing, a monetary compensation to a CEO in case a takeover occurs. 
TP Provisions Categorical variable ranging from 0 to 3. It includes the provisions that simply make a 
takeover process harder without providing manager with any monetary compensation in 
the case of a takeover. 
 
CEO Age The age of a firm’s CEO 
CEO Ownership The percentage of stocks owned by a CEO excluding stock options 
Dualityt-1 A dummy variable equal to 0 if two independent people serve as the CEO and COB and 1 
otherwise 
 
E-Index Categorical variable ranging from 0 to 6. The presence of each of the six antitakeover 
provisions adds a value of 1 to the E-Index 
 
Firm Size The value of a firm’s Total Assets 
Independent 
Directors 
The percentage of independent directors serving on a company’s board. This study uses the 
definition of independent directors as provided by the RiskMetrics. Consistent with the 
NASDAQ listing rule 5605 (2), independent directors are those who are independent of top 
management, are not ex-employees, and do not have any business relationship with the 
company. 
 
Leverage The ratio of a firm’s Debt to Total Assets. 
Liquidity The ratio of a firm’s cash to Total Assets 
R&D Exp. The annual dollar amount spent by a company on research in order to create future 
opportunities for investments or invention of new products. 
ROAt-1 Return on Assets at time t-1. 
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 Variable Definition 
 
Golden 
Parachutes 
Golden parachutes are compensations paid to senior managers in case they 
resign, or they are fired from their position, after a successful takeover. 
They suggest that golden parachutes take away the right of shareholders to 
replace the management team without experiencing heavy costs.  
 
Poison Pills Poison pills give stockholders of the acquired firm, different from the 
bidder, the right to buy stocks in one of the two merged companies at a 
great discount price.  
 
Staggered 
Boards 
 
A staggered board is a board in which its members are split into different 
and overlapping classes for re-election (usually 3 classes). This separation 
makes it impossible for the bidder to replace a majority of the board 
members in one single year, even if the bidder has support from the 
majority of shareholders. Therefore, in order for a bidding firm to gain full 
control of the board, they have to wait for several years (at least 2 election 
periods). 
 
Supermajority 
Requirement to 
Approve a 
Merger 
A supermajority requirement for mergers is a provision that necessitates a 
percentage of voting that is higher than that of the state law in order to 
approve a merger (common used percentages are 66.7, 75, or 85 percent).  
 
Limitations on 
Bylaw and 
Charter 
Amendments 
These provisions limit the ability of shareholders to make changes in the 
documents that govern the corporation. The limitations can range from 
requiring a supermajority of shareholders to vote in order to approve 
bylaws and charter amendments to eliminating the shareholders’ capacity to 
make changes in the bylaws and charter or even give the directors the right 
to make amendments to the charter and bylaws without having the 
shareholders’ consent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
